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and demonstrate the necessity to include family firm specific characteristics such as family 
goals and corporate governance structures in the analysis of financing decisions    
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Influence of internal factors on the use of equity- and mezzanine-based financing in  
family firms 
Ann-Kristin Achleitner, Eva Lutz and Stephanie Schraml 
 
1.  Introduction 
Family firms have an important role in economies around the globe. For instance in Ger-
many, the majority of companies can be considered to be family firms and other countries, par-
ticularly in continental Europe, show similar patterns (Klein 2004). Family firms usually follow 
an overall business strategy targeted towards sustainability which is a success model in line with 
the preferences of different stakeholders of the company as well as policy makers. However, the 
complex interplay of the family and the business may not only be a source of competitive ad-
vantage, but may also pose specific challenges on family firm owners (Habbershon, Williams, 
and MacMillan 2003). It is necessary to solve family conflicts and to focus on policies which 
safeguard the long term existence of the company (Kets de Vries 1993). In this context, financ-
ing decisions are important as they are the basis for future company growth and survival. De-
spite their important role, current knowledge on family firms is still limited in this area. In par-
ticular, scholars have not yet investigated specific drivers of financing decisions in privately 
held family firms and have primarily focused on analyzing differences to non-family firms in 
their overall capital structure (Coleman and Carsky 1999; Gallo, Tàpies, and Cappuyns 2004; 
López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar 2007; Mishra and McConaughy 1999). The unique struc-
ture in family firms allows the family owners to influence the firm’s strategy with their personal 
preferences or objectives. Therefore, it is particularly important to understand internal drivers of 
financing decisions in the specific context of a family firm.  
We address this research gap and analyze factors which influence the use of financial in-
struments in privately held family firms. We investigate the impact of family specific factors 
such as goals of the family as well as corporate governance structures on the use of different  
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financial instruments including retained earnings, private equity and silent partnerships. 
Thereby, we contribute to a better understanding of financing decisions in family firms and 
demonstrate the necessity to include family firm specific characteristics in the analysis of the 
use of financial instruments. 
 
2.  Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1.  Family specific goals and corporate governance structures 
In traditional finance theories, it is usually not analyzed how financial decisions are made 
within the firm as the company is treated as a managerial black box (Barton and Gordon 1987). 
On the contrary, scholars adopting the strategy paradigm have called for a more holistic analysis 
of financing decisions within firms. They account for complex dependencies between the goals 
of the management as well as owners of a company and the decision for certain financial in-
struments (Barton and Gordon 1987; Gallo, Tàpies, and Cappuyns 2004). This can be expected 
to be particularly relevant for family firms as they are characterized by complex dependencies 
between the family and the company (Wu, Chua, and Chrisman 2007). Hence, their financing 
decisions are the result of multidimensional decision making processes which have to take ac-
count of the multifaceted preferences of the parties involved. Therefore, we set out to analyze 
the role of internal factors in deciding for or against different financial instruments in family 
firms.  
Family firms are usually defined by the strong influence of the family on the company. 
This influence usually stems from the majority ownership of the company in the hands of the 
family. In addition, family members often have an important role in the management or super-
visory board of the firm (Klein 2000; Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Sharma 2004). The system 
of the family and the system of the company are intertwined and the complex goals of different 
family members have an influence on the strategy in a company, but also on operational deci-
sions (Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua 1997). Therefore, the overall objective in a family firm  
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goes beyond maximizing profits and also includes many non-financial objectives. Families are 
shown to follow a diverse set of goals with their role in a company (Tagiuri and Davis 1992; 
McCann, Leon-Guerrero, and Haley 2001; Westhead 2003). We are going to focus on six fam-
ily specific goals which were found to be important: (i) independence and control, (ii) financial 
security, (iii) low financial risk, (iv) company growth, (v) long term orientation and (vi) social 
responsibility. 
An important goal for family firms is to be independent and to have full control over the 
company as external influence could prevent them from pursuing family values. Therefore, the 
objectives independence and control are the basic prerequisite for achieving other family spe-
cific goals. In addition, strong power of the family can increase efficiencies and flexibility in 
operational and financial decisions as the interests within a family are usually more aligned 
compared to the interests of external parties (Levin and Travis 1987; Kets de Vries 1993; 
Gersick et al. 1997). 
Another objective for families is to secure their financial situation through their family 
business. Particularly in the initial stages of company development, family owners often invest 
a high portion of their personal wealth into the company. Once the family firm is established 
and realizes stable earnings, the family owners then expect to be rewarded for their input 
through dividends, salaries or cash withdrawals. Their aim is to reach and maintain a certain 
standard of living and to secure financial flexibility (Tagiuri and Davis 1992; Ward 1997; 
McCann, Leon-Guerrero, and Haley 2001; Yilmazer and Schrank 2006).  
In the long term, a large share of family wealth usually remains tied to the company and 
the family has only limited diversification opportunities for their financial resources. A negative 
company development hence has a high impact on the family wealth and may lead to liquidity 
problems in the family. In addition, the family invests a large portion of its human capital into 
the company through family employment. Therefore, family firms aim to lower the overall risk  
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of the company and show a higher risk aversion compared to non-family firms (McMahon and 
Stanger 1995; Mishra and McConaughy 1999).  
Company growth in order to secure and gain market share is also an important goal for 
family firms. Family firms have to grow in the long term to be able to fulfil the demands of a 
growing family (Ward 1997; Gersick et al. 1997). However, it can also be argued that family 
firms shy away from high company growth to sustain their independence and, therefore, they 
rather follow a conservative approach to company development with moderate company growth 
(Poutziouris 2001). The conflict between growth and independence becomes apparent if an ex-
ternal financing, particularly equity financing, is required to finance growth because this type of 
financing is usually accompanied with a loss in control. 
In a family firm, the owner family is willing to support the company development in the 
long term through investment of financial as well as human resources. The so called patient 
capital of a family is an important source of competitive advantage for family firms (Sirmon 
and Hitt 2003). Family firms have the goal of long term orientation because they aim to hand 
down the company to the next generation (James 1999). The company does not only represent 
an investment or employment opportunity, but also represents family tradition and capability 
(Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006).  
Family firms often feel socially responsible to secure the long term existence of their 
company and, thereby, to protect the jobs of their employees (Uhlaner, van Goor-Balk, and Ma-
surel 2004; Stavrou, Kassinis, and Filotheou 2007). For family owners, employee satisfaction in 
their daily work life is of high priority to increase employee retention, but also because their 
reputation in society is important – particularly if the company name entails the family name 
(Dyer and Whetten 2006). 
We have identified six key family specific goals and we are going to build on these goals 
to formulate hypotheses how they impact financing decisions in family firms. In addition to the 
complex goal structure, family firms are also characterised by a unique corporate governance  
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structure. We focus on three bodies in the corporate governance structure of family firms: (i) 
ownership, (ii) management board and (iii) supervisory board. 
Ownership of family firms is usually highly concentrated on the family. For Germany, it 
was shown that in a large majority of family firms the family holds 100% of the equity (Klein 
2004). On the one hand, this concentrated ownership gives the family the power and incentive 
to monitor and control the management closely (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Blanco-Mazagatos, 
de Quevedo-Puente, and Castrillo 2007). On the other hand, the family is in the position to 
abuse its role and make decisions which serve only their own interest and are not necessarily in 
the interest of the company (Claessens et al. 2002). Furthermore, without any non-family own-
ers the ownership structure may lack diversity in experience with operational and/or financial 
decisions (Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006). In this context, the active generation and the 
number of family owners are relevant. With each succession from one generation to the next, 
the number of family owners is likely to increase due to the increasing family size. Therefore, 
the ownership structure becomes more complex. For instance, in a more fragmented ownership 
base of a fourth generation family firm, each single family owner has less decision power com-
pared to a more concentrated ownership base in a first generation family firm. The individual 
goals of family owners can differ which may lead to conflicts (Lubatkin et al. 2005). In addi-
tion, in later generations it is likely that family owners have different roles with some being 
actively involved and others being mainly passive shareholders (Blanco-Mazagatos, de 
Quevedo-Puente, and Castrillo 2007). This can also imply a decreasing identification with the 
family firm in later generations (Karra, Tracey, and Phillips 2006). These circumstances may 
hinder the efficient control and monitoring of the company despite concentrated ownership in 
the hands of the family clan. 
The management board in family firms can either consist of family members, of external 
managers or of a mixture of the two. KLEIN shows that in 44% of German family firms, exclu-
sively family members sit on the management board and in only 14% exclusively external man- 
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agers (Klein 2004). Family firms often decide against external managers because they believe 
that the objective of external managers differs from family specific goals (Daily and Dollinger 
1992). In addition, they may fear that false decisions of external managers are going to harm the 
family reputation even though the family was not responsible for them (Schachner, Speck-
bacher, and Wentges 2006). Furthermore, external managers may consider family firms to be a 
less attractive career option as their career possibilities are limited due to the dominant role of 
the family (Sirmon and Hitt 2003).  
From the perspective of the family, the presence of external managers leads to a need for 
control mechanisms as the goals of the management may not be inline with family goals 
(Westhead and Howorth 2006). Principal-agent-relationships may emerge due to the separation 
of ownership and management (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and, hence, special mechanisms 
such as the establishment of a supervisory or advisory board may be required. However, in the 
light of the resource based view the inclusion of external managers can also broaden the hetero-
geneity and objectivity of managerial resources in the company. 
Specific control mechanism may also be necessary in an all family member management 
board due to principal-agent-relationships. This is the case if the management board is charac-
terized by one-sided altruism and free-riding family members (Schulze et al. 2001; Schulze, 
Lubatkin, and Dino 2003). In addition, the problem of self control exists in case of the union of 
ownership and management. However, in case the management board entails intrinsically moti-
vated family members with similar objectives, stewardship structures are likely (Chrisman et al. 
2007) and, hence, control mechanisms should be of minor importance or even counter produc-
tive. 
In Germany, the two tier system requires the separation of executive directors in the man-
agement board from non-executive directors in a supervisory or advisory board. Depending on 
the legal form and the size of a company, a supervisory board is mandatory. For the German 
limited liability company GmbH, the most common legal form for privately held family firms, a  
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supervisory board has to be formed if the company has more than 500 employees. In addition, 
employee representation is required in case of a mandatory supervisory board. For companies 
with more than 500 and less than 2,000 employees, the supervisory board has to consist of one 
third of employee representatives. In companies with more than 2,000 employees, half of the 
members of the supervisory board have to be employee representatives (Wiedemann and Kögel 
2008).  Companies with less than 500 employees may decide voluntarily to set up a non-
executive board which is then called advisory board and normally does not include employee 
representatives. 
Despite different legal regulations across countries with a two tier system and a one tier 
system, the supervisory board or non-executive directors generally share the same main func-
tions of monitoring and advising the management board or executive directors (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003). In a family firm, the supervisory/advisory board is often in a sandwich position 
between the family owner and the family manager who are either the same person or at least in 
close relations to each other. This makes it more difficult to monitor the family manager (Klein 
2005). Furthermore, family owners often decide to appoint family members or external parties 
who are in friendship or good business terms with the family to the supervisory/advisory board 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003). It is questionable whether the supervisory/advisory board 
then fulfils the monitoring function (Corbetta and Salvato 2004), especially in case of a volun-
tary advisory board. Apart from the controlling function, the supervisory/advisory board is also 
expected to advise the management by using their own capabilities and networks (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003). From a resource based view, the supervisory/advisory board can therefore add 
important human resources to a company. Furthermore, the supervisory/advisory board can 
potentially act as a mediator between different parties. Conflicts between family managers and 
external managers might be easier to solve with the presence of another, third party 
(Blumentritt, Keyt, and Astrachan 2007). In order to fulfil the advisory function, trust between 
the family members and the members of the supervisory/advisory board is required. Existing  
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ties to the members of the supervisory/advisory board can be helpful to establish this trust and 
to foster the advisory function, but at the same time existing ties are likely to make the monitor-
ing function more difficult (Klein 2005).  
Based on the family specific goals as well as corporate governance structures in family 
firms, we formulate hypotheses on how they influence the decision to use certain financial in-
struments including retained earnings, private equity and silent partnerships.  
 
2.2.  Use of retained earnings 
According to a number of descriptive studies, retained earnings as a form of internal eq-
uity financing are most often used to finance family firms (Dunn and Hughes 1995; Ou and 
Haynes 2006). This preference confirms pecking order theory which postulates that internal 
financing is preferred over external forms of financing as they often lead to undervaluation be-
cause of informational asymmetries between the company and external capital providers (Myers 
and Majluf 1984). However, particularly in family firms with their unique objectives and corpo-
rate governance structure other reasons may also call for the use of retained earning. 
Family specific goals 
The preference for retained earnings can also be explained with the goal of independence 
and control in family firms. The company remains independent from external debt or equity 
providers if it relies on this internal form of financing (Romano and Ratnatunga 1994). There-
fore, we hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 1.1: The goal of independence and control positively influences the use of re-
tained earnings in family firms. 
In general, earnings can be used for different purposes and in addition to using them as an 
internal form of financing e.g. for growth investments, they can also be paid out as dividends. 
Family owners expect to be financially rewarded for taking over the entrepreneurial risk and to  
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be able to secure a certain standard of living (Ward 1987). The financial expectation of the fam-
ily competes with the capital requirements of the company (Dreux 1990). A dividend policy in 
favour of the family can therefore hinder opportunities to use retained earnings. Hence, we pos-
tulate: 
Hypothesis 1.2: The goal of financial security of the family negatively influences the use of 
retained earnings in family firms. 
Family firms often follow the goal of lowering their financial risk exposure and, as a con-
sequence, they may follow a conservative approach of financing through the use of retained 
earnings (McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko 2001). The company is then not burdened by 
additional interest payments or debt repayments and no additional equity provider with dividend 
or payout expectations comes into play. Therefore, we posit: 
Hypothesis 1.3: The goal of lowering the financial risk positively influences the use of re-
tained earnings in family firms. 
The objective of company growth is also likely to influence the use of retained earnings in 
family firms. On the one hand, a growth strategy may lead to the policy that a large portion of 
earnings is going to be used to finance the growth and the family, therefore, foregoes receiving 
dividends or pay-outs (Adams et al. 2004). On the other hand, a growth strategy may also be 
accompanied by higher leverage (Mizruchi and Stearns 1994). As earnings are usually volatile 
and not a secure, long term source of financing, a growth strategy usually can not solely rely on 
the use of retained earnings and often requires additional debt financing (Kotey 1999). Due to 
tax deductible interest payments, this is going to lower the available earnings and the opportu-
nity to use them as an internal form of financing is squeezed. Hence, we formulate two oppos-
ing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.4a: The goal of company growth positively influences the use of retained 
earnings in family firms.  
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Hypothesis 1.4b: The goal of company growth negatively influences the use of retained 
earnings in family firms. 
The goal of long term orientation is likely to lead to a family policy towards reinvesting 
earnings into the company instead of extracting them for private use of the family (Sirmon and 
Hitt 2003). A focus on social responsibility is also likely to manifest itself in a company focused 
policy on the use of earnings instead of a focus on increasing the personal wealth of the family 
(Sirmon and Hitt 2003). Therefore, we postulate: 
Hypothesis 1.5: The goal of long term orientation positively influences the use of retained 
earnings in family firms. 
Hypothesis 1.6: The goal of social responsibility positively influences the use of retained 
earnings in family firms. 
Corporate governance structures 
The use of earnings as internal form of financing competes with the use of earnings as 
dividends to family members. With an increasing number of family owners in later generations, 
the absolute amount of expected payouts to the family is going to increase. In addition, a higher 
number of passive family owners is likely to alter the family’s overall identification with the 
company. With a larger set of owners, a high portion of them may focus less on the company 
and put more emphasize on maximizing their own return (Gersick et al. 1997). Therefore, we 
postulate: 
 Hypothesis 1.7: The number of family owners negatively influences the use of retained 
earnings in family firms. 
The presence of external managers in the management board may lead to lower use of re-
tained earnings. In case of low or no involvement of family members in the management board, 
the family is likely to not identify themselves strongly with the company and, hence, their focus 
lies on gaining high dividends which decrease the share of earnings available to use as internal 
financing (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997). Furthermore, a management board domi- 
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nated by external managers can create agency problems as the managers act as agent with dif-
ferent objectives than the family as principal (Westhead and Howorth 2006). A policy towards 
paying out a large portion of earnings can then, similar to higher leverage, act as a mechanism 
to discipline the management towards increasing efficiencies in the company. Hence, we posit: 
 Hypothesis 1.8: The presence of external members on the management board negatively 
influences the use of retained earnings in family firms. 
 
2.3.  Use of private equity 
As financial investors, private equity firms invest external equity in private or public 
companies with the aim to increase the value of their equity share and to then create a return 
upon their exit (Wright and Robbie 1998). For family firms, private equity is an alternative way 
of external equity financing which offers in addition to financial resources non-financial support 
from the private equity firms. However, many family firms shy away from private equity even 
though the structure of this form of financing is highly flexible and can range from majority to 
minority investments (Achleitner, Schraml, and Tappeiner 2008). The reasons for reservations 
against private equity are manifold and also include psychological barriers as well as negative 
perceptions from the media (Poech, Achleitner, and Burger-Calderon 2005). Our aim is to shed 
more light on family firm specific characteristics which foster or hinder the use of private eq-
uity. 
Family specific goals 
An important objection against private equity lies in the loss of family control over the 
business. Private equity firms become new shareholders of the company and usually receive 
additional information, control and liquidation rights. Particularly in majority investments this 
implies an extreme reduction in the independence and control of the family (Easterwood, Seth, 
and Singer 1989; Berg and Gottschalg 2005). But also in minority investments, private equity  
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firms often gain special control or veto rights and the family has to share the control over the 
company (Achleitner, Schraml, and Tappeiner 2008). Therefore, we posit: 
Hypothesis 2.1: The goal of independence and control negatively influences the use of 
private equity in family firms. 
In contrast, the family goal to foster company growth can lead to a higher preference for 
the use of private equity. Sustainable, long term growth often requires investments which can 
not be financed through internal forms of financing. In comparison to debt financing, private 
equity offers the advantage of a positive capital structure effect due to the increase in equity 
(Berggren, Olofsson, and Silver 2000). In addition, private equity firms do not only provide 
financial resources, but also non-financial support for the family firm. By giving access to their 
experience and networks, private equity firms can be helpful in realizing company growth 
(Poutziouris 2001; Upton and Petty 2000). Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2.2: The goal of company growth positively influences the use of private equity 
in family firms. 
The goal of long term orientation in family firms is not in line with the limited time hori-
zon of a private equity firm. They aim to realize an exit after three to five years after their in-
vestment and this exit poses a threat to the continuity and long term orientation in family firms. 
The form of exit highly depends on external circumstances, such as the current status of public 
capital markets and the merger environment (Wright et al. 2008). Therefore, the type of exit 
usually remains unclear until shortly prior to the actual exit. In some cases, families arrange a 
call option to be able to buyback the shares from the private equity firms (Achleitner et al. 2008; 
Achleitner, Schraml, and Tappeiner 2008). However, they are not common and families are 
then often not in the position to exercise the option. In addition, the focus on realizing a return 
in the mid term is not in line with the long term approach of family firms towards value genera-
tion (Achleitner, Schraml, and Tappeiner 2008). Hence, we propose:  
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Hypothesis 2.3: The long term orientation negatively influences the use of private equity 
in family firms. 
In regard to the goal of social responsibility, the use of private equity can also be prob-
lematic. The aim of private equity firms is often to create value through increasing efficiencies 
in the companies they invest in. It is then likely that organizational slack is reduced, but this 
slack offers some flexibility to safeguard employment even in difficult circumstances (Fox and 
Marcus 1992). However, social responsibility can also imply that family owners focus on safe-
guarding company survival and private equity may be the last resort to do so. In financial dis-
tress, despite initial objections family owners may therefore turn to private equity. Following 
pecking order theory, private equity is the least preferred option, but in certain situations it can 
be the only option available to the family (Berggren, Olofsson, and Silver 2000). Therefore, we 
propose two opposing hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 2.4a: The goal of social responsibility positively influences the use of private 
equity in family firms. 
Hypothesis 2.4b: The goal of social responsibility negatively influences the use of private 
equity in family firms. 
Corporate governance structures 
Following the resource based view, a supervisory/advisory board can broaden the pool of 
human resources of the company. In a family firm, a supervisory/advisory board with additional 
financial experience is potentially able to reduce reservations of the family against less conser-
vative forms of financing such as private equity (Poutziouris 2001; Poech, Achleitner, and Bur-
ger-Calderon 2005). The supervisory/advisory board can then act as mediator between the fam-
ily and private equity firms. In addition, an existing supervisory/advisory board may serve as 
positive signal for interested private equity firms (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Hence, the exis-
tence of a supervisory/advisory board may foster the use of private equity. However, an existing 
supervisory/advisory board may also decrease the likelihood of using private equity. A supervi- 
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sory/advisory board which provides the management with helpful advice and contacts and 
which monitors the company closely may already offer the required non-financial support to the 
management (Achleitner, Schraml, and Tappeiner 2008). Therefore, the advantage of private 
equity firms as smart money providers is less relevant and private equity would be a less attrac-
tive option. Hence, we formulate two opposing hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 2.5a: The existence of a supervisory/advisory board positively influences the 
use of private equity in family firms. 
Hypothesis 2.5b: The existence of a supervisory/advisory board negatively influences the 
use of private equity in family firms. 
 
2.4.  Use of silent partnerships 
Mezzanine capital describes all hybrid forms of financing which can not be clearly classi-
fied as equity or debt because they have characteristics of both (Tirole 2006). We focus on the 
silent partnership as equity linked mezzanine capital. The silent partner provides the company 
with equity and participates in its profits, but he is not explicitly involved in the management. 
However, he has the right to get access to annual reports of the company (Achleitner, Schraml, 
and Tappeiner 2008). It remains to be analyzed how family specific goals and corporate gov-
ernance structures influence the use of silent partnerships. 
Family specific goals 
 Apart from the access to annual reports of the company, a silent partner usually has no 
further control rights. The independence and control of the family is therefore safeguarded to a 
high degree. Particularly in comparison to a private equity investment, the silent partnership has 
the advantage of still leading to a positive capital structure effect, but without the loss of control 
as in a private equity investment (Achleitner, Schraml, and Tappeiner 2008). Therefore, we 
posit:  
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 Hypothesis 3.1: The goal of independence and control positively influences the use of si-
lent partnerships in family firms. 
The goal of financial security of the family can also have an impact on the decision to use 
a silent partnership. The profit participation of the silent partnership can be flexibly designed, 
but usually it entails a fixed rate of return and a flexible return depending on the profits. Both, 
the fixed and variable financial obligations can decrease the financial flexibility and liquidity of 
the family. Hence, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3.2: The goal of financial security of the family negatively influences the use of 
silent partnerships in family firms. 
Family firms with the goal of company growth are likely to not only rely on volatile inter-
nal forms of financing, but also to use external capital sources. Silent partnerships are often 
used in this respect to finance growth projects for which a debt financing is not suitable or 
available (Coleman and Carsky 1999; Cassar and Holmes 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3.3: The goal of company growth positively influences the use of a silent part-
nership in family firms. 
Following similar arguments as for private equity, the goal of social responsibility may 
enforce or hinder the use of silent partnerships. The ongoing return expectations of the silent 
partner may hinder a company policy focussed on long term survival of the company and secur-
ing employment (Berman et al. 1999). However, in certain circumstances the company may be 
in desperate need of external financing to keep up the operations and the family is then likely to 
also consider alternative ways of financing it would otherwise disregard. Hence, we test two 
opposing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.4a: The goal of social responsibility positively influences the use of silent 
partnerships in family firms. 
Hypothesis 3.4b: The goal of social responsibility negatively influences the use of silent 
partnerships in family firms.  
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Corporate governance structures 
A silent partner is usually entitled to a fixed rate of return on his investments and, in addi-
tion, expects to receive variable return based on the company’s earnings. The payments to the 
silent partner reduce the amount available for dividends to straight equity holders (Brezski et al. 
2006). With an increasing number of family owners in a company, this can lead to reservations 
against this type of financing because the family owners then generally put more emphasis on 
maximizing their own return (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3.5: The number of family owners negatively influences the use of silent part-
nerships in family firms. 
The payments to the silent partner can be interpreted as a mechanism to discipline external 
managers because it reduces the free cash flow available for investments. It thereby reduces the 
risk of over investments by the management and agency costs can be reduced. Therefore, we 
posit: 
Hypothesis 3.6: The presence of external managers positively influences the use of silent 
partnerships in family firms. 
Similar to the arguments presented for the use of private equity, an existing supervi-
sory/advisory board can influence the preference for silent partnerships in two opposing direc-
tions. On the one hand, external members of the supervisory/advisory board can potentially 
reduce existing reservations against the silent partnership as a less conservative financing ap-
proach. Furthermore, a supervisory/advisory board may act as positive signal to potential silent 
partners who are then more likely to invest in the company. On the other hand, a supervi-
sory/advisory board usually already fulfils a control function over the management which may 
make it less important to put additional discipline mechanisms, such as a mezzanine financing 
through a silent partnership, in place. Therefore, we formulate two opposing hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 3.7a: The existence of a supervisory/advisory board positively influences the 
use of silent partnerships in family firms. 
Hypothesis 3.7b: The existence of a supervisory/advisory board negatively influences the 
use of silent partnerships in family firms. 
 
3.  Sample description and methodology 
Our study is based on a survey of German privately held family firms. The questionnaire 
included 22 questions in four categories: goals of the family, the use of different financial in-
struments, the corporate governance structure and general business statistics. The questionnaire 
was targeted towards family owners and the questions regarding family goals were specifically 
linked to overall family goals and not personal goals. Our aim was to capture the aggregated 
objectives of the family. Prior to sending out the questionnaire, we conducted a pre-test of it 
with three owners and managers of family firms to detect issues the respondents might have 
with filling it out (Bradburn, Sudman, and Wansink 2004) and to ensure that the time to fill out 
the questionnaire did not exceed 15 minutes. 
We used the Hoppenstedt database and the member list of AlphaZirkel, an association of 
family firms in Germany, to compile a list of 1,818 German family firms. In mid 2007, we sent 
out the final questionnaire to family owners and, four weeks later, a follow-up via telephone 
was carried out in order to increase the response rate. Prior to the follow-up, initial checks of the 
representativeness of our sample showed high similarities with the large samples in IfM Bonn 
2007 and Klein 2004, e.g. in terms of size, age and industry. However, we found that Bavaria 
was slightly overrepresented in the initial sample and, therefore, we concentrated our follow-up 
on other regions to avoid a geographic bias. 
We received a total of 247 questionnaires which represents a response rate of 13.6%, but 
we were not able to use all of them. Our aim was to ensure that in our sample the family has a 
relevant influence on company policies. We included companies in which the family either held  
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100% of the ownership and/or had majority control over the management or supervisory board 
(Klein 2000). In addition, we excluded publicly listed companies and companies from the fi-
nancial sector. We were able to identify a total of 237 questionnaires representing a response 
rate of 13.0%. However, due to missing data we were only able to use 195 questionnaires for 
the analysis on the financial instruments presented here (response rate 10.7%). 
Our analysis is focused on three dependent variables: (1) use of retained earnings 
(Use_RE), (2) use of private equity (Use_PE), and (3) use of silent partnership (Use_SP). All 
three variables are binary variables with one representing the current use of the instrument and 
zero representing the non-use.  
As independent variables, we use different variables representing the family specific 
goals as well as corporate governance structures. As independent variables for family objectives 
we include independence and control (G_Control), financial security (G_FinSecurity), low fi-
nancial risk (G_LowRisk), company growth (G_Growth), long term orientation (G_LongTerm) 
and social responsibility (G_SocialResp). The importance of these goals for the family was sur-
veyed using a nine point likert scale (1 = highly irrelevant, 9 = highly relevant). We decided for 
this broad scale to allow for sufficient nuances and higher variance in the replies (Alwin 1997). 
Furthermore, we include three independent variables representing the corporate governance 
structure: number of family owners (CG_FamOwners), presence of external managers on the 
management board (CG_ExtManagers) and presence of a supervisory/advisory board 
(CG_SupBoard). While the variable for the number of family owners is a metric variable, the 
two other corporate governance specific variables are binary variables with one indicating the 
presence of external managers or a supervisory/advisory board and zero indicating the non-
presence.  
Furthermore, we use different control variables to take account of potential differences 
due to company size, age, industry and level of financing need. In order to control for company 
size, we use the natural logarithm of the revenue in the last financial year as given by the re- 
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spondents (Revenue_ln). The company age was also surveyed in the questionnaire and repre-
sents the number of years since the founding date (Age). The level of financing need is likely to 
influence the choice of financial instruments. Following pecking order theory, companies in 
financial distress may decide for a certain financial instruments because they require additional 
financing and have no alternative. We use two control variables as proxy for the level of financ-
ing need. First, we use the level of financial distress (FinDistress) which was surveyed based on 
a seven point likert scale (1 = very little, 7 = very high). Second, we refer to revenue growth 
over the past three years as compound annual growth rate to include a proxy for the level of 
internal financing ability (RevGrowth). We want to exclude industry effects and, therefore, dif-
ferentiate between three industries: manufacturing, service and retail. In our regression analysis, 
we include two binary industry variables for manufacturing industries (Manufact_Ind), and ser-
vice industries (Service_Ind). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of our dependent, independent 
and control variables. 
Our aim is to explain the use of different financial instruments in family firms and, more 
specifically, the impact of family specific goals and corporate governance structures on the use 
of retained earnings, private equity and silent partnerships. We follow a rather explorative ap-
proach and, hence, we do not try to find the most efficient model to explain our dependent vari-
ables. Therefore, we include all independent and control variables which we have identified in 
our models in order to then support or reject our hypotheses. We do not try to optimize our sta-
tistical models in a second step through the exclusion of certain variables. We use binary logit 
regressions to analyze the use of different financial instruments.  
As recommended for questionnaire based studies, we undertook a number of robustness 
tests. First, we checked for an early- versus late respondent-bias in our data. It can be expected 
that late respondents are similar to companies who do not respond at all. Therefore, this tests 
indirectly checks whether a non-response-bias exists (Oppenheim 1966). Based on a discrimi-
nant analysis, we tested whether the respondents prior to the follow-up were significantly dif- 
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ferent to the respondents thereafter. The difference in means analysis did not reveal any signifi-
cant differences between the two groups. 
Furthermore, we tested for multicolinearity in our data. As many of the variables are di-
chotomous or categorical, we use Kendall’s tau to analyze correlations. Table 2 depicts the cor-
relation matrix and reveals high correlations only for our industry variables. This correlation 
analysis only reveals bivariate relationships; so we also checked tolerance and variance inflation 
factors as additional indicators for multicolinearity (Studenmund 2006), and we did not find any 
indication for multicolinearity problems in our data. Finally, we tested for extreme values and 
found it to be necessary to use the natural logarithm for the variable revenue because we found 
extreme values which might otherwise distort our results. 
 
4.  Empirical results on the use of financial instruments 
4.1.  Retained earnings 
Table 3 provides the results of our binary logistic regression with the use of retained earn-
ings as dependent variable. Overall, the model is significant at the 0.05 level and has a Nagelk-
erke’s R
2 of 0.33 and, therefore, we assume to be able to show relevant drivers for the use of 
this financial instrument in family firms. 
The goal of social responsibility has a significant positive influence (B=0.758; p=0.005) 
on the use of retained earnings and we can support Hypothesis 1.6. Furthermore, the results 
show that the goal to lower financial risk also has a positive impact on the use of retained earn-
ings (B=0.480; p=0.028) and support Hypothesis 1.3. Both of these goals represent a sustain-
able and conservative policy focussed on the interests of the company which manifests itself in 
the use of retained earnings. 
In contrast, the goal of company growth (B=-0.470; p=0.077) as well as the presence of 
external managers (B=-1.164; p=0.080) have a significantly negative influence on the use of 
retained earnings and we can support Hypothesis 1.4b (reject Hypothesis 1.4a) and 1.8. Regard- 
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ing the growth strategy, there could be two rationales for the lower importance of retained earn-
ings. Retained earnings may not be sufficient in order to finance a growth strategy as they are 
volatile and insecure. Furthermore, alternative financial instruments required for growth in-
vestments such as a debt financing may lower the retained earnings due to interest and debt re-
payments which will then lower the earnings available for internal financing. The presence of 
external managers seems to lower the willingness of the family to waive dividends or pay-outs 
in order to reinvest earnings into the company. 
For all other variables, we did not find significant relationships. For the goals of financial 
security, long term orientation and the number of family owners, the coefficient is negative as 
predicted in our hypotheses, but not significant. Therefore, we have to reject Hypothesis 1.2, 1.5 
and 1.7. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the goal of independence and control is negative, but 
again not significant so that we also have to reject Hypothesis 1.1. 
The control variables company size (B=0.822; p=0.031) and revenue growth (B=1.025; 
p=0.019) have significant positive influence on the use of retained earnings. This is an intuitive 
result because both of them are important factors in order to generate earnings which are high 
enough after dividends to be reinvested into the company. 
 
4.2.  Private Equity 
The results of the binary logit regression with the use of private equity as dependent vari-
able are shown in Table 4 and project an overall model significance at the 0.01 level. The Na-
gelkerke’s R
2 of 0.334 gives an indication that we are able to find drivers of the decision to use 
private equity. 
At first glance surprisingly, the goal of social responsibility has a highly significant posi-
tive impact on the use of private equity (B=1.094; p=0.003) supporting Hypothesis 2.4a and 
rejecting Hypothesis 2.4b. It is likely that a strong focus on social responsibility and, hence, the 
company survival leads to financial decisions which are foremost in the interest of the company  
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and interests of the family which may call for other financial instruments are less important. 
This argument is underlined by the highly significant influence of the control variable of the 
level of financial distress (B=0.509; p=0.004). In line with the pecking order theory, family 
firms seem to turn to private equity particularly often if the company is facing difficult circum-
stances and, possibly, no other alternative is available. Using private equity as a last resort may 
then safeguard the existence of the company. 
Another interesting result can be seen in the impact of the existence of a supervi-
sory/advisory board which has a negative influence on the use of private equity (B=-1.030; 
p=0.101). Through an existing supervisory/advisory board the need for additional monitoring 
and support from private equity firms may become less relevant. This argument seems to be 
stronger than the argument that external board members may reduce negative perceptions to-
wards private equity or that a supervisory/advisory board may act as a positive signal for private 
equity firms. Hypothesis 2.5a is rejected and, with favourable consideration of the significance 
level, Hypothesis 2.5b is supported.  
For the remaining family specific goals, we were not able to find significant relationships. 
Even though the coefficients are in line with our hypotheses, the negative influence of the goal 
of independence and control (Hypothesis 2.1), the positive influence of the goal of company 
growth (Hypothesis 2.2) and the negative influence of the long term orientation goal (Hypothe-
sis 2.3) are all not significant.  
 
4.3.  Silent partnership 
The use of silent partnerships was also analyzed based on a binary logit regression and its 
results are presented in Table 5. The model has a high overall level of significance of 0.000 and 
the Nagelkerke’s R
2 of 0.393 indicates that we can identify important factors to explain the use 
of silent partnerships.  
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The goal of independence and control has a significant positive influence on the use of si-
lent partnerships (B=0.443; p=0.022). Family firms seem to highly appreciate that a silent part-
nership, particularly in comparison to private equity, is accompanied with lower levels of loss in 
control so that we can support Hypothesis 3.1. Furthermore, we find a significant negative rela-
tionship between the goal of financial security and the use of silent partnerships (B=-0.427; 
p=0.082) and can support Hypothesis 3.2. From the perspective of the family, the continual re-
turn expectation of a silent partner lowers the financial flexibility and liquidity of the family. 
The coefficients of the remaining independent variables are not significant and we have to 
reject Hypothesis 3.3, 3.4a/b, 3.5a/b, 3.6 and 3.7a/b. Similar to our results for private equity, the 
coefficient of the goal of social responsibility is positive, but not significant for the use of silent 
partnerships. Furthermore, the control variable of financial distress has a highly significant posi-
tive influence (B=0.640; p=0.000) which is in line with pecking order theory. Under negative 
circumstances, the family is going to turn towards financial instruments which they would 
probably not consider otherwise in order to safeguard the existence of the company. The control 
variable for the company size also has a significant positive influence on the use of silent part-
nerships (B=0.868; p=0.000) and can be explained with a minimum financing volume which is 
usually required to close a silent partnership. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
With our paper, we make two main contributions. First, we theoretically analyze in detail 
how internal factors of privately held family firms such as family specific goals and corporate 
governance structures shape financial decisions. We follow a holistic view of how financial 
decisions are made and we try to depict the managerial black box which is usually assumed in 
financial theory. 
Second, we are able to explore our conceptual findings empirically and are able to show 
important relationships. Our results show that parallel existing goals of privately held family  
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firms can result in diverging financing preferences. Retained earnings are used more often if the 
family has the goal to minimize risk or to guarantee company survival and less often if the fam-
ily goal is focused on company growth. Private equity is more often used if the company is in 
financial distress and if the family is focused on safeguarding the company’s existence. A silent 
partnership is more often used if independence and control is a main goal of the family and less 
often used if the family is focused on providing financial support for family members.  
Furthermore, we find that the impact of corporate governance structures on financing de-
cisions is mainly driven by the existence of an advisory board and the involvement of external 
managers in the management board. Retained earnings are less often used if an external man-
ager is part of the management board and private equity is less often used in case a supervi-
sory/advisory board already exists. Table 6 gives an overview over our hypothesis and summa-
rizes the results. 
Our results can help family firms to analyze and to critically assess their internal drivers of 
financial decisions. In addition, our results can help external capital providers to understand 
patterns underlying the decision making process in family firms and consultants can use our 
findings to support family firms with their complex structures to decide for the most suitable 
financing alternative. An insightful management of the proposed determinants of financial deci-
sions in family firms can allow for an adequate consideration of the manifold objectives of the 
family and a long term survival of the family firm. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our multivariate tests.  
 
Variable n Mean Median S.D. Min. Max.
Dependent variables
Use of retained earnings (Use_RE) 191 0,95 1,00 0,23 0,00 1,00
Use of private equity (Use_PE) 195 0,07 0,00 0,25 0,00 1,00
Use of silent partnership (Use_SP) 192 0,11 0,00 0,31 0,00 1,00
Independent variables - family specific goals
Independence and control (G_Control) 195 7,33 8,00 1,93 1,00 9,00
Financial security (G_FinSecurity) 195 7,79 8,00 0,92 4,00 9,00
Low financial risk (G_LowRisk) 195 6,41 7,00 1,49 2,00 9,00
Company Growth (G_Growth) 195 6,81 7,00 1,26 3,00 9,00
Long term orientation (G_LongTerm) 195 7,58 8,00 0,96 4,00 9,00
Social responsibility (G_SocialResp) 195 6,65 7,00 1,39 2,00 9,00
Independent variables - corporate governance structure
Number of family owners (CG_FamOwners) 195 3,71 2,00 7,52 1,00 100,00
Presence of external managers (CG_ExtManage 195 0,53 1,00 0,50 0,00 1,00
Presence of supervisory board (CG_SupBoard) 195 0,37 0,00 0,48 0,00 1,00
Control variables
Revenue in the last financial year 195 192,51 65,00 550,76 1,00 7.000,00
Age 195 69,91 59,00 51,90 4,00 410,00
Level of financial distress (FinDistress) 195 2,51 2,00 1,64 1,00 7,00
CAGR of revenue (RevGrowth) 195 0,10 0,09 0,14 -0,54 0,95
Manufacturing industries (Manufact_Ind) 195 0,66 1,00 0,48 0,00 1,00
Service industries (Service_Ind) 195 0,18 0,00 0,38 0,00 1,00




Table 2:  Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficients based on Kendall’s tau between the variables used for our multi-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3:  Logit regression: Use of retained earnings 
This table presents the results of the binary logit regression with the use of retained earnings as dependent vari-
able.  
 




G_Control -,329 ,720 ,269 ,111
G_FinSecurity -,146 ,864 ,240 ,271
G_LowRisk ,480 ** 1,616 ,251 ,028
G_Growth -,470 * ,625 ,330 ,077
G_LongTerm -,352 ,704 ,476 ,230
G_SocialResp ,758 *** 2,134 ,297 ,005
CG_FamOwners -,013 ,987 ,082 ,437
CG_ExtManagers -1,164 * ,312 ,828 ,080
Revenue_ln ,822 ** 2,276 ,441 ,031
Age ,000 1,000 ,010 ,485
FinDistress -,131 ,877 ,231 ,285
RevGrowth 1,025 ** 2,787 ,496 ,019
Manufact_Ind -1,138 ,320 1,172 ,166
Service_Ind ,366 1,441 1,321 ,391
(Constant) -1,897 ,150 5,058 ,354
n 191







Table 4:  Logit regression: Use of private equity 
This table presents the results of the binary logit regression with the use of private equity as dependent variable.  
 




G_Control -,203 ,816 ,184 ,135
G_Growth ,017 1,017 ,303 ,478
G_LongTerm -,073 ,930 ,324 ,411
G_SocialResp 1,094 *** 2,987 ,403 ,003
CG_SupBoard -1,030 (*) ,357 ,809 ,101
Revenue_ln ,086 1,089 ,280 ,380
Age -,020 ** ,980 ,012 ,038
FinDistress ,509 *** 1,664 ,192 ,004
RevGrowth ,048 1,049 ,381 ,450
Manufact_Ind -1,736 ** ,176 ,880 ,024
Service_Ind -1,668 * ,189 1,059 ,058
(Constant) -7,771 ** ,000 4,134 ,030
n 195






Table 5:  Logit regression: Use of silent partnerships 
This table presents the results of the binary logit regression with the use of silent partnerships as dependent vari-
able.  
 




G_Control ,443 ** 1,557 ,220 ,022
G_FinSecurity -,427 * ,653 ,307 ,082
G_Growth -,209 ,812 ,243 ,195
G_SocialResp ,254 1,289 ,208 ,111
CG_FamOwners -,050 ,951 ,104 ,315
CG_ExtManagers -,298 ,742 ,565 ,299
CG_SupBoard -,030 ,971 ,615 ,481
Revenue_ln ,868 *** 2,381 ,248 ,000
Age -,022 *** ,978 ,008 ,004
FinDistress ,640 *** 1,897 ,171 ,000
RevGrowth ,343 1,409 ,341 ,157
Manufact_Ind -,647 ,524 ,756 ,196
Service_Ind -1,029 ,357 ,973 ,145
(Constant) -7,399 ** ,001 3,257 ,012
n 192







Table 6:  Overview of hypotheses and results 
 
 
- + (*) - + CG_SupBoard
Supported hypotheses indicated in gray
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01
Use_RE Use_PE USE_SP
Hypothesis Sig. Hypothesis Sig. Hypothesis Sig.
G_Control + - + **
G_FinSecurity - - *
G_LowRisk + **
G_Growth + - * + +
G_LongTerm + -
G_SocialResp + *** + - *** + -
CG_FamOwners - + -
CG_ExtManagers - * +
- + (*) - + CG_SupBoard
Supported hypotheses indicated in gray
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01
Use_RE Use_PE USE_SP
Hypothesis Sig. Hypothesis Sig. Hypothesis Sig.
G_Control + - + **
G_FinSecurity - - *
G_LowRisk + **
G_Growth + - * + +
G_LongTerm + -
G_SocialResp + *** + - *** + -
CG_FamOwners - + -
CG_ExtManagers - * +
dependent
variables
independent 
variables